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A key problem with Minnesota’s policy is that we have not
asked the right questions. We’ve asked “How can we lock up the
most dangerous?” We should be asking, “How can we prevent
the most violence?” We should be intensely studying the issue,
and allocating scarce resources to a mix of programs and
1
approaches whose prevention efficacy has empirical support.
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INTRODUCTION

Sexual violence is one of the most difficult issues we face in the
human condition. Anyone can be a victim—the harm knows no
demographic boundaries. In Minnesota, it was estimated that in
one year more than 61,000 residents were subjected to a sexual
2
This number could nearly fill the Metrodome in
assault.
downtown Minneapolis.
And survivors face many personal
challenges. Rape is among “the most severe of all traumas, causing
3
multiple, long-term negative outcomes.” Even with the many
strides that have occurred in recent years to support a victimcentered response, survivors who seek help from the legal, medical,
and mental health systems, among others, still “may face disbelief,
4
blame, and refusals of help instead of assistance.” It is a problem
that demands a response from all levels of society. And yet, this
response is lacking.
But the inadequacy of the sexual violence response does not
lie solely within our systems or the victim-blaming myths
perpetuated by society and reflected in jury pools. Public policy,
the driving force behind the system response, has failed to see the
big picture when it comes to the relationship between effective law
making and sexual violence prevention and intervention.
According to Joan Tabachnick and Alisa Klein, authors of A
Reasoned Approach: Reshaping Sex Offender Policy to Prevent Child Sexual
Abuse, “Experts agree that a criminal justice response alone cannot
prevent sexual abuse or keep communities safe. Yet, tougher
sentencing and increased monitoring of sex offenders are fully
funded in many states, while victim services and prevention
5
programs are woefully underfunded.” An effective policy geared
towards ending sexual violence and holding offenders accountable
must be comprehensive in its approach, constructed with the view
of preventing sexual violence from occurring in the first place,
2. TED R. MILLER ET AL., PACIFIC INST. FOR RESEARCH & EVALUATION, COSTS OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN MINNESOTA: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 4 (2007),
available at http://www.pire.org/documents/mn_brochure.pdf.
The study
contains statistics for the year 2005.
3. Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual Assault
on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 225, 225 (2009).
4. Id. at 226.
5. JOAN TABACHNICK & ALISA KLEIN, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL
ABUSERS, A REASONED APPROACH: RESHAPING SEX OFFENDER POLICY TO
PREVENT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 3 (2011), available at http://www.atsa.com/pdfs
/ppReasonedApproach.pdf.
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aggressively intervening when it does, and looking to the future to
stop further harm.
But current public policy is decidedly lopsided in its response,
so focused on punishment, particularly for the worst-of-the-worst
offenders, that there is little opportunity for ideas about
prevention—let alone meaningful support for victims or farreaching rehabilitation programs for offenders—to gain serious
traction in the discussion. This state of affairs is driven, in part, by
the complexity of the issues, and no one would argue that they are
not among the most difficult and politically unpopular any
lawmaker has to face. Considerable public safety and public health
concerns are at stake.
Still, horrific headlines about sex crimes often translate into
near-instant legislative solutions, without regard to the fact that
there may not be a one-size-fits-all answer, that there may be a
negative unintended consequence in some other part of the legal
response, or that sexual violence requires a comprehensive and
6
well-considered strategic approach. According to the Council of
State Governments, “Some state leaders have expressed concern
that the urgency of efforts to strengthen sex offender management
policy is prohibiting lawmakers from fully considering the range of
7
long-term impacts such policies will have.” Little time is spent
reviewing the evidence or collecting expert opinion when the
public pressure is on to punish sex offenders. Prevention-related
proposals are sometimes met with skepticism in this retributive
environment because it is difficult to prove that a sexual violence
crime did not occur and that its non-occurrence has a causal link to
6. Id. at 21–24. According to Tabachnick and Klein:
There is a growing understanding that the simple solutions offered by
legislative policies broadly applied to every offender have not been
effective in keeping children safe or preventing sexual abuse.
Furthermore, the isolation and stigmatizing effect of legislation on sex
offenders and their families have generated a number of unintended
consequences that limit family, community, and societal ability to
prevent sexual abuse in the first place. Tough restrictive policies are
needed for the most dangerous sex offenders in society. But these
policies are applied broadly and typically do not recognize the
continuum of behaviors of sexual abuse, the range of ages of those who
sexually abuse, and the range of risk posed by sex offenders to reoffend.
Id. at 42.
7. See id. at 28 (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
POLICY IN THE STATES: STRENGTHENING POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2010), available at
http://www.csg.org/policy/documents/SOMFinalReport-FINAL.pdf).
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8

a specific policy. As the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence
(NAESV), a victim-centered organization committed to educating
federal policymakers about best practices in the sexual violence
response, wrote in a 2008 position statement:
States and communities across the nation are developing
measures to manage adult sex offenders with the express
purpose of increasing safety for victims and communities.
Unfortunately, not all measures currently being enacted
do, in fact, increase safety. Some put communities at
9
higher risk, while others create a false sense of security.
One good example of misdirected public policy is residency
restrictions, which, according to some studies (including one by the
Minnesota Department of Corrections), show little success in
preventing re-offenses or providing a reliable protective strategy for
10
public safety. And yet, this blanket solution still holds currency
11
among many policymakers.
Victim advocacy organizations such as NAESV and the
12
Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA) have a
strong interest in a robust public policy response to ending sexual
violence. But the response must make sense and take into account
both prevention and intervention strategies, backed by research
and expertise in the field. The authors of this article contend that
Minnesota policymakers are at a crossroads. Policymakers have an
unprecedented opportunity to make some important changes, ones
that incorporate prevention and intervention strategies. This
opportunity comes out of necessity—not only because the harm

8.
9.

See id.
Id. at 27 (citing NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE, COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS: REGISTRATION, ELECTRONIC MONITORING, CIVIL
COMMITMENT, MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS (2008), available
at http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/CommunityManagement.pdf).
10. Id. at 24; see MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY AND SEX
OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 2 (2007), available at http://www.doc
.state.mn.us/documents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity.pdf (finding that reoffenses would have not been deterred by residential restrictions); see also COLO.
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4 (2004),
AND
available at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/sex_offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01
.pdf (demonstrating that residency restrictions are not deterrents to sex offense
crimes).
11. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 1a (2012) (creating residency
restrictions for some juvenile offenders).
12. See MINN. COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, http://www.mncasa.org
(last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
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persists, but also because the current system, particularly the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program, is under close scrutiny due to
13
mounting costs and looming legal challenges.
The key question we as a society confront is what changes will
satisfactorily balance justice for victims with offender
accountability, attempts at rehabilitation through treatment, and
high community expectations about public safety. This article
offers background on what the discussion about prevention of
14
sexual violence can look like, a theoretical analysis of the policy
15
conundrum facing our lawmakers, and some examples of how
prevention and intervention strategies can be put into practice in
Minnesota law, as advanced through MNCASA’s legislative
16
agenda, with the hope that a new direction can be charted toward
the best possible public policy response for the state.
II. SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION: REDEFINING THE DISCUSSION
Responsibility for the prevention of sexual violence is often
placed on the individual and most commonly manifests itself in the
form of risk-reduction techniques such as self-defense courses,
safety tips, the buddy system, and educational programs for
children about good touch and bad touch. While these tools do
have value, they can also create a false sense of security, a belief
that the individual alone can prevent sexual violence from
17
occurring, or even a belief that it is the individual’s duty to do so.
The most prepared and informed person can still be a victim of
sexual violence. There are only so many variables that can be
controlled, and, ultimately, it is the perpetrator who decides to
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. There are also unintended consequences related to risk-reduction
strategies. For example, it may not be safe to fight back during an attack,
especially if the perpetrator has a weapon, is bigger than the victim, or employs
some sort of coercive or threatening tactic. Also, many risk-reduction strategies
are focused on stranger attacks when statistics show that the victim often knows the
assailant in some way (family, friend, intimate partner, acquaintance, fellow
student, employee, etc.). Non-stranger perpetrators are able to use trust against a
victim in ways that a stranger cannot. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
sixty-four percent of female victims and forty percent of male victims of violent
crimes knew the perpetrator. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 9 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj
.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf.
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commit the crime. Still, society continues to subscribe to beliefs
18
When
about sexual assault that place blame on the victim.
prevention strategies focus only on the victim’s perceived
responsibilities, without regard to the potential perpetrator’s
criminal actions, they only serve to perpetuate the myths.
Sexual violence prevention strategies are modeled upon a
19
public-health approach.
There are three levels of prevention
strategies that can be applied to the analysis: primary, secondary,
20
and tertiary. Primary prevention takes action to prevent problems
from occurring in the first place. It involves a systematic process
that promotes healthy behaviors and an environment that reduces
the likelihood or frequency of occurrence. Secondary prevention
is the immediate response after an incident. It addresses shortterm consequences and is most commonly recognized as crisis
intervention. Victim advocacy, responses from law enforcement
and medical providers, and community-based awareness campaigns
describing an assault are examples of secondary prevention
responses. Tertiary prevention attempts to decrease the long-term
disability associated with the problem and looks to prevent possible
reoccurrence of the problem. Examples of tertiary prevention
responses are extended support and treatment for sexual assault
survivors, sex offender treatment programs, and reform of criminal
21
sexual conduct statutes. The justice system response is interwoven
within the secondary and tertiary levels.
Another common prevention analysis is the spectrum of
prevention. Larry Cohen developed this nationally recognized
response model while he was director of the Contra Costa Health
22
Services Prevention Program in California. It can be applied to a
18. See State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 293 (Minn. 2011) (“The research
provided by the State and amici shows that the public holds and gives credence to
rape myths.”); see also Kaarin Long et al., A Distinction Without a Difference: Why the
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Overrule Its Precedent Precluding the Admission of
Helpful Expert Testimony in Adult Victim Sexual Assault Cases, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 569, 579–91 (2010).
19. See MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE PROMISE OF PRIMARY PREVENTION OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO PREVENT SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND
EXPLOITATION IN MINNESOTA 8 (2009) [hereinafter PROMISE OF PRIMARY
PREVENTION], available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/pub/svpplan.pdf;
see also Our Approach, PREVENTION INST., http://www.preventioninstitute.org
/about-us/our-approach.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
20. PROMISE OF PRIMARY PREVENTION, supra note 19, at 5.
21. Id.
22. See The Spectrum of Prevention: Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Injury
Prevention, PREVENTION INST., http://www.preventioninstitute.org/component
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variety of public-health concerns, from violence prevention to
nutrition, fitness, traffic safety, and injury prevention, among many
23
others.
There are six levels for strategy development in the spectrum
that “are complementary and when used together produce a
synergy that results in greater effectiveness than would be possible
24
by implementing any single activity.” This multi-tiered approach
creates roles for the individual, the community, and greater society:
(1) strengthening individual knowledge and skills, (2) promoting
community education, (3) educating providers, (4) fostering
coalitions and networks, (5) changing organizational practices, and
25
(6) influencing policy and legislation.
The spectrum
demonstrates that the prevention response depends on a variety of
partners, organizing on both the grassroots and the formal systemic
levels, to be successful.
No one person, organization, or
policymaker can do it alone. A variety of strategies needs to be
deployed, and many different types of audiences (of all ages and
developmental levels) should be targeted with specially tailored
messages. Participants on all levels of the spectrum are engaged
and innovating as the problem evolves over the passage of time.
Meaningful policy responses to sexual violence always consider
the role of prevention. The Governor’s Commission on Sex
Offender Policy, convened by Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty
from 2004 to 2005, for example, included in its recommendations
the need for “increas[ed] attention to the prevention of sex
26
crimes.” The Commission’s members noted:
While the potential long-term cost savings to the public
health system from preventing sex crimes are large—as is
the potential to avoid suffering by victims—specific
strategies on how to break cycles of offending are less
clear. The Department of Health’s work on violence
prevention is a valuable start; and more should be done to
develop, research and discover effective prevention

/jlibrary/article/id-105/127.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). “[T]he Spectrum [of
Prevention] is based on the work of Dr. Marshall Swift in treating developmental
disabilities.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON SEX OFFENDER POLICY, FINAL REPORT 6 (2005)
[hereinafter GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION], available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us
/commissionsexoffenderpolicy/commissionfinalreport.pdf.
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27

strategies.
The Minnesota Department of Health later found that the cost of
sexual violence to the state of Minnesota could be estimated at $8
28
These are significant
billion, or $1540 per resident, in 2005.
numbers that have caught the attention of policymakers in the time
since they were reported, but responsive action has been mostly
29
limited to intervention efforts. To this date, no state dollars have
30
been invested in sexual violence prevention.
It is time to shift the policy-making paradigm and prioritize
31
As Tabachnick and Klein
prevention in an effective manner.
stated in A Reasoned Approach, “The field of public health calls for
policies that alter developmental trajectories leading to initial
perpetration of violence as opposed to the exclusive use of after32
the-fact responses.”
Prevention and intervention “are not
diametrically opposed constructs”—and as renewed attention is
paid to improve the system response to sexual violence in
Minnesota (and particularly the management of the sex offenders
in the state’s expensive and controversial civil commitment
program), there is also a renewed opportunity to promote
33
innovative solutions before the harm occurs.
27. Id.
28. MILLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. The cost estimate was 3.3 times the
costs incurred by alcohol-impaired driving. Id. at 13. The costs include medical
care, mental health care, lost work, property damage, suffering and lost quality of
life, sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, suicide acts, substance abuse,
victim
services/out-of-home
placement,
investigation/adjudication,
sanctioning/treatment, earning loss while confined, and primary prevention. Id.
It is believed that the $8 billion figure is actually low because several costs, such as
those borne by counties, were not included in the study. Id. at 10.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See Sexual Violence Prevention Program, MINN. DEPARTMENT HEALTH,
http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/topic/svp/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 15,
2013). Current funding for the Minnesota Department of Health’s in-house and
contracting efforts in the area of prevention comes from federal sources such as
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Id.
31. See CAROLINE PALMER, UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PREVENTION
AND
INTERVENTION
STRATEGIES
TO
STOP
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/MCASA
_UnderstandingRelationshipBetweenPrevIntervenSV_3-2010.pdf.
32. TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 27 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC INJURY RESEARCH AGENDA 2009–2018 (2009),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/injury/ResearchAgenda/CDC_Injury_Research
_Agenda-a.pdf).
33. PALMER, supra note 31, at 3. Note that the Minnesota Department of
Human Services formed, under court order, a Sex Offender Civil Commitment
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III. RELEVANT HISTORY OF SYSTEM RESPONSES TO SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN MINNESOTA
It is helpful to review some of the legislative and other public
policy responses to sexual violence in Minnesota before moving
forward to analyze the benefits of stronger integration of
prevention and intervention responses. Many of these reforms
emerged in the 1970s in an attempt to “craft a legal system that
better reflects modern society’s norms and expectations relating to
34
sexual assault cases.”
But even with these changes, conviction
35
rates for sexual assault “remain the lowest for any serious felony.”
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412, one example of an early legal
reform, bars evidence of a victim’s past sexual conduct from being
36
admitted at trial except in narrow circumstances.
Commonly
referred to as the “rape shield law,” Rule 412 has its foundation in
Minnesota Statutes section 609.347. Despite trial protections of a
sexual assault victim’s character and past sexual activities being a
37
more contemporary issue, the rape shield became law in 1975
38
amid sweeping reform to Minnesota’s treatment of sex crimes.
Buried beneath criticism of a slow-moving legislature and debates
about gas taxes and handgun control, the reform received little
39
attention. Nonetheless, the statutes enacted on the last day of the
1975 legislative session of the Minnesota legislature are the basis for
40
the current sex crimes within the Minnesota Criminal Code.
Advisory Task Force in October 2012. See Larry Oakes, Magnuson Leads Task Force
on Sex Offender Treatment, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 7, 2012, at A7, available at
2012 WLNR 21340608.
34. Long et al., supra note 18, at 574 (citing Donald Dripps, After Rape Law:
Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV.
957, 961 (2008)).
35. Id. at 575 (citing David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in
the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1210 (1997)); see also
Jane Kim, Comment, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
263, 264 n.8 (2012).
36. Such evidence is only admissible when the “probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature”
and either the defense is raising “consent of the victim” as a defense or “the
prosecution’s case includes evidence of semen, pregnancy or disease.” MINN. R.
EVID. 412(1).
37. See State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 282 (Minn. 2011).
38. See Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1243, 1249–50.
39. See Legislators, Legislature Get Poor Marks, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Aug. 31, 1975,
at 1A.
40. All references herein to “criminal code” shall mean the Minnesota
Criminal Code unless stated otherwise. See Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 8, 1975

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 6

2013]

MINNESOTA’S RESPONSE TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE

1593

The reform diversified the nature of criminal sexual conduct
and abandoned more primitive notions of offender accountability,
improving understanding about the limits of consent and who
holds the power of consent. Prior to 1975, the criminal code
division labeled “sex crimes” contained eleven sections that failed
41
to create culpability for most sexual violence.
For example,
Minnesota Statutes sections 609.291 and 609.292, titled “aggravated
rape” and “rape,” respectively, only accounted for forced sexual
42
intercourse by a man against a woman who is not the man’s wife.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.296, “indecent liberties,” also
created a spousal exception. Furthermore, unless the sexual
violence involved a child, these were the only mechanisms by which
a person could be held liable for sexual assault.
In 1975, the legislature repealed the “aggravated rape,” “rape,”
and “indecent liberties” statutes; the replacements are present-day
Minnesota Statutes sections 609.341 through 609.3451, which have
had some changes since 1975 but not any sort of wholesale
overhaul. These statutes use the phrase “criminal sexual conduct,”
a phrase absent from the criminal code prior to 1975, to represent
varying degrees of sexual violence. By eliminating outdated
notions of sexual violence, such as the spousal exception, and
broadening the conduct constituting an offense, the legislature
began to recognize the complexity of sexual violence. Since 1975,
this recognition has grown as cognizance of sexual violence has
become greater. Offenses such as solicitation of minors for sexual
43
44
acts, nonconsensual contact with a sexual intent, and sex
45
trafficking are examples of the legislature’s attempts to cast a
wider net on the problem of sexual violence.
However, as the culpability net has widened, the legislative
considerations for victims have failed to keep pace. In addition to
the rape shield law, the 69th Legislature passed Minnesota Statutes
section 609.35, which codified a county’s obligation to pay for
46
medical expenses related to examining a sexual assault victim.
These two sections symbolize a rarity in the politics surrounding
sexual violence: victim-focused policy. Today, thirty-two statutes
Minn. Laws 1243, 1249–50.
41. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.291–.295 (1974).
42. Id. §§ 609.291–.292 (repealed 1975).
43. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.281–.284 (2012).
44. See id. § 609.321.
45. See id. § 609.322.
46. See Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 374, § 11, 1975 Minn. Laws 1243, 1251.
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compose the “sex crimes” division of chapter 609 of the criminal
47
code. Of those thirty-two, only three (one addition since 1975)
48
are aimed at victims.
Notably, Minnesota Statutes chapter 611A is intended to aid
victims of crime generally. Chapter 611A contains sections that
allow for the creation of sexual violence victim services, but without
appropriate and consistent funding, the efficacy of these sections
fails. Punishment, not restitution, has become the rule for sexual
violence policy. The offender focus of the legislature has become
perhaps most vivid in the last two decades with the evolution in
application of Minnesota’s sex offender laws.
A.

Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program

When determining whether to commit a sex offender, the
State of Minnesota initially relied upon a 1939 law that allowed for
the civil commitment of individuals with sexual psychopathic
49
personalities.
After the law was immediately challenged on
constitutional grounds, the Minnesota Supreme Court established
the standard to determine whether one is apt for civil commitment:
50
“an utter lack of power to control [one’s] sexual impulses.” The
law remained almost dormant until high-profile sexual assaults in
51
Yet, as of 1990, less than thirty
the 1980s led to its revival.
52
individuals were in the state’s civil commitment program. Since
1990, there have been two important changes to the commitment
process—one procedural and one substantive. Both of these
changes were exacerbated by two high-profile events involving sex
offenders.
Prior to 1991, county attorneys were charged with identifying
53
possible candidates for the civil commitment program.
If the
county attorney deemed an individual to meet the “lack of power to
47. See §§ 609.293–.353.
48. Enacted in 1984, Minnesota Statutes section 609.3471 keeps information
pertaining to a minor sexual assault victim confidential.
49. See § 253B.02, subdiv. 18b.
50. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND
THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 29 (2006) (quoting State ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)).
51. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION REPORT:
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 4–5 (2011), available at http://www.auditor
.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
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control” standard, the county attorney could file a petition for a
hearing. At that hearing, a judge (never a jury) would hear the
case for civil commitment, and the State would be charged with
meeting a burden of “clear and convincing evidence.” A would-be
commitment had a right to appeal a judicial decision to commit.
In 1991, the Department of Corrections began referring possible
54
civil commitment candidates to the county attorney, thus
reducing the “legwork” county attorneys had to perform and easing
their ability to commit offenders. The referral procedure, coupled
with the pre-1991 procedure, is the current process for civilly
committing sex offenders.
In 1992, the State recommended Dennis Darol Linehan for
the civil commitment program. The State argued that Linehan,
after spending nearly thirty years in jail for rape and murder,
should be committed because he had been a bad person, not
because he had an “utter lack of power to control” his sexual
55
impulses.
A trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
agreed.
However, in 1994 the Minnesota Supreme Court
overturned the commitment, holding Linehan did not meet the
high threshold ignored by the lower courts—“utter lack of power to
56
control.” Despite Linehan’s somewhat advanced age (fifty-three
in 1994) and the fact that his release would be supervised, media
57
In a special
and public outcry caused the legislature to act.
session convened in the aftermath of Linehan’s non-commitment,
the legislature passed the current standard for the commitment of
58
sex offenders. A person with “sexual psychopathic personality”
still qualifies for civil commitment, but a lower threshold of
“sexually dangerous person” also qualifies an individual for
59
commitment. The latter standard has three elements: (1) past
harmful sexual conduct; (2) sexual, personality, or other mental
disorder or dysfunction; and (3) recidivist risk.
In the face of the substantive change to civil commitment
jurisprudence, in 2000 the Minnesota Sex Offender Program had
60
grown to 149 individuals (a large increase from 1990 but low
compared with the current population). In 2003, the number of
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
JANUS, supra note 50, at 29–30.
See id. at 30 (referring to the Pearson standard).
See id. at 31–32.
See id. at 32.
See MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subdiv. 1 (2012).
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 3.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/6

12

Palmer and Prowant: Re-thinking Minnesota's Criminal Justice Response to Sexual Viole

1596

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

commitments rose dramatically in response to outrage over the
tragic rape and murder of college student Dru Sjodin by a noncommitted sex offender who had been recently released from a
61
Minnesota correctional facility. Pressured by the Governor, the
Department of Corrections began referring large numbers of
convicted sex offenders to county attorneys in hopes that another
sex offender would not “slip through.” In the five years following
the tragic events surrounding Sjodin’s death, the Department of
Corrections referred 157 sex offenders per year to county
attorneys; in the previous twelve years, the Department of
Corrections had referred a total of 333 sex offenders for civil
62
commitment.
The procedural and substantive changes
implemented by 2003 resulted in two-thirds of current “clients” of
the Minnesota Sex Offender Program being committed between
63
2004 and 2012.
In 2010, the Legislative Auditor evaluated the sex offender
program and returned unsettling results. Each commitment costs
the State of Minnesota approximately $120,000 per year, almost
64
three times as much as an inmate in Minnesota’s prisons. The
program is predicted to grow at a rate slightly under ten percent
for the next ten years (approximately fifty-three new commitments
65
each year), totaling 1109 commitments in 2020.
Thus far, the
predicted growth rate has proved accurate as the sex offender
66
program had 683 clients as of March 31, 2013. The underlying
sexually violent offenses that each offender committed should not
be minimized; however, such growth is unsustainable.
Given that the Legislative Audit Committee is comprised of
both Democrats and Republicans from both legislative bodies,
lawmakers are cognizant of the unsustainability of such growth.
With that awareness, seeking alternative means by which to combat
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id. at 5.
63. See DENNIS BENSON ET AL., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM: WORKING
TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.state.mn
.us/main/groups/agencywide/documents/pub/dhs16_166449.pdf; Minnesota Sex
Offender
Program
Overview,
MINN.
DEPARTMENT
HUMAN
SERVICES, http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_
CONVERSION&dDocName=dhs16_149914&RevisionSelectionMethod
=LatestReleased (last updated Apr. 3, 2013 3:02 PM). The authors combined the
statistical information from these two sources in order to calculate this number.
64. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 1.
65. Id. at 4–5.
66. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Overview, supra note 63.
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sexual violence seems to be the next logical step. However, current
policy still fails to account for prevention-focused policy as a
legitimate method for curbing sexual violence and a wise outlet for
state funds that can complement ongoing intervention-based
responses.
B.

Practical Concerns

All commitments to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program are
considered “clients” receiving treatment for their disorders, and all
have been committed following prison sentences for sexual
67
violence. Theoretically, they cannot be prisoners (and must be
clients), or it would result in constitutional violations regarding
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. The United States
Supreme Court dismissed these concerns by finding that civil
68
commitment following a prison term is not punitive in nature.
However, in 1982 the Court ruled that a person civilly committed
for a mental disorder must be receiving adequate treatment or
such commitment violates the Due Process Clause of the
69
Fourteenth Amendment.
Some courts have applied this
condition to the civil commitment of sex offenders, and a failure to
70
provide appropriate treatment has resulted in injunctive relief.
Within these cases lurks an alarming possibility: civil commitment
may be a veneer for preventative detainment. Such concerns are
beginning to arise in Minnesota because of the large number of
offenders being committed and the low number being released
(only one thus far). The most recent manifestation of these
concerns is the certified class action by clients of the sex offender
71
program against the Minnesota Department of Human Services.
Another concern is the high number of individuals Minnesota
commits. Of the twenty states that operate sex offender civil
commitment programs, Minnesota commits the most per capita
and has the third most in gross commitments behind Florida and
72
California. As noted above, each individual in Minnesota’s sex
offender program remains there at a cost of approximately
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
2012).
72.

Id.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370–71 (1997).
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982).
Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
See Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2012 WL 6044652 (D. Minn. Dec. 5,
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 16–18.
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73

$120,000 per year.
The sex offender program operates at a
74
budget of approximately $70 million annually. Absent a decrease
in commitments and/or large-scale releases, the money needed to
operate the sex offender program will continue to rise at alarming
rates. And yet, while the legislature continues to fund the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program, it allocates zero dollars for the
prevention of sexual violence.
Furthermore, taking the
legislature’s approach to sexual violence as a whole, it spends more
money on sexual offenders than it does on victims of sexual
75
offenses.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT POLICY RESPONSE: THE PROBLEM
OF INDUCTION
The history of the policy response to sex offender
management is defined by fear and reactionary politics. This is
understandable; sexual violence is an emotionally charged issue
with high public interest. In the wake of events such as Linehan’s
controversial release and the tragedy of Sjodin’s death, the public
demands immediate actions to ensure safety needs are met, and its
representatives act with little heed to the costs (both monetary and
societal).
Unfortunately, groups focused on sexual violence
prevention receive less attention and, as a result, less funding. This
course of action results in a tunneling of our focus. According to
Eric Janus, as described in his book Failure to Protect, “We have
restricted our focus to the ‘downstream’ part of the problem—
those individuals who continue to offend even after they have gone
to prison—and have rendered less visible the ‘upstream,’ but much
76
larger, aspect of the problem.”
Although seemingly academic, there is another manner in
which to characterize the problem that plagues the rationale
behind sexual violence policy: the problem of induction. The
problem of induction was championed by nineteenth century
British philosopher David Hume (although he did not explicitly
call it such) in response to his concerns about causal inferences.
Hume worried that over-reliance on past experience could lead
73.
74.

$117,000 per resident in 2010; $122,000 per resident in 2011. Id. at 12.
Range in the last four years: $75 million in 2008 to $67.5 million in 2011.

Id.
75. In 2006, Minnesota spent $130.5 million on sexual offenders and $90.5
million on victims of sexual violence. MILLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–10.
76. JANUS, supra note 50, at 50.
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one to believe that nature behaves in a uniform manner despite
our experience demonstrating otherwise. Put simply, the problem
of induction is creating a general rule from an isolated experience;
the “problem” is unsound reasoning because there is a lack of
necessary causation. For example, if the most recent sexually
violent offender had traits x, y, and z, all sexually violent offenders
will embody such traits. Yet this type of erroneous reasoning
continues to pervade sexual violence policy. Simple existential
awareness of the beliefs and presumptions that drive current sexual
violence policy could improve future reasoning and promote
sounder approaches.
More contemporary work has proliferated that further
explicates the poor reasoning underlying current sexual violence
77
policy. In 2007, epistemologist Nassim Taleb advanced the
problem of induction through his “Black Swan Theory.” The idea
stems from the following fallacious example: It was once thought
only white swans existed because only white swans had ever been
observed; when a black swan was observed, it had a profound
impact because it undermined current “understanding.” Such is
the course of a “black swan event.” Taleb warns against the black
swan event because the less it is accounted for, the greater impact it
will have. At the same time, black swan events are not predictable,
and they are not objective; they result from overconfidence in
78
knowledge and a failure to recognize epistemic limitations. The
gravity of a black swan event results from the event being outside
“the usual” and the (sometimes extreme) over-reliance on
recurring but not necessary recurring events. However, their effects
can be mitigated by checking what we think we “know” and by not
attempting to retrospectively justify the events as foreseeable, thus
circumventing the notion that such events were ever outside our
knowledge.
Perhaps most importantly, Taleb is not engaged in a purely
academic exercise—he is concerned with the effect epistemic
arrogance has on our everyday lives. This is because when
pervasive false beliefs are unsettled, the consequences are
magnified. The rationale underlying sexual violence policy fits
77. Nassim Nicholas Taleb is a Lebanese-born epistemologist who focuses on
the problems of luck, uncertainty, and probability. He holds a professorship at
New York University’s Polytechnic Institute.
78. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE, AT xxiii (2d ed. 2010).
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squarely within Taleb’s paradigm. High profile, widely reported
events like rape or murder lead people to believe such events are
“the norm” instead of the rarity. Furthermore, it is believed that
the same small group of people is responsible for this “norm.” This
false norm, coupled with the illusory belief that most sexual
violence is committed by strangers (i.e., stranger danger), results in
policies that are highly reactionary to soothe the general fear of the
public. Yet most individuals who commit sexually violent acts
resulting in prison sentences have no prior history of a violent
offense, and sex offenders with a prior conviction for a sexual
offense comprise only fourteen percent of those in prison for
79
sexual violence. Furthermore, it is estimated that in most sexual
assaults the victim knows the perpetrator; approximately fifteen
percent of those in prison for sexual assault claim their victim was a
80
stranger to them.
Finally, even though these statistics
demonstrate violent sexual offenses do not fit the common
stereotype, a substantial proportion of sexual violence goes
81
unreported, and thus, these statistics may be inflated. Ignorance
of common facts about sexual violence coupled with a failure to
account for the sexual violence that is unseen leads to a failure to
make comprehensive sexual violence policy.
Data defying what is believed to be the “norm” demonstrate
that the legislature’s sexual violence policies are a result of
epistemological arrogance (i.e., believing that all sexual offenders
fit the same traits). When a rare, high profile event (i.e., black
swan event) occurs, such as the Sjodin tragedy, the public and
legislature consider such an event as an affirmation of their
“knowledge” (e.g., stranger danger, high recidivism) instead of an
unpredictable aberration.
This type of reasoning creates an
inconsistency whereby people are reacting abnormally to what they
perceive as normal. Meanwhile, the bulk of sexual violence never
figures into the equation. Instead of over-relying on the usual (e.g.,
intra-family sexual violence) and being shocked by the rare event
(e.g., the Sjodin tragedy), the rare event is relied upon as “the
usual.” When this “usual” occurs, it has the shock effect of the rare
(because it is in fact a rare event). This is directly in line with
Taleb’s warnings. The black swan event cannot be predicted, only
hedged. Our false perceptions (i.e., epistemic arrogance) amplify
79.
80.
81.

JANUS, supra note 50, at 43.
Id. at 46; see also TRUMAN, supra note 17, at 9.
JANUS, supra note 50, at 46–47.
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the reaction to the rare (black swan) event. Instead of focusing on
that which can be known, such is ignored in the quixotic quest to
prevent an event outside our epistemic range. To reify, by
believing the infrequent, horrific sexually violent act can be
predicted (and thus prevented), the majority of sexual violence
goes unheeded and the focus of sexual violence policy continues in
vain.
In the wake of rare, shocking sexual violence, the reasoning
behind policy for the last two decades has been that such assaults
were “foreseeable” if only the “right factors” would have been
82
noticed. This narrative fallacy has led to the procedural and
substantive changes occurring in sex offender policy; legislatures
believe the rare, unpredictable event is within their power to
prevent.
As such, significant resources (via Department of
Corrections referrals, county attorney assessments, and the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program) are devoted to detaining
previously convicted sex offenders and creating obstacles to
rejoining society for released sex offenders. Consequently, little or
no resources are allocated to programs that focus daily on
preventing common sexual violence (seen and unseen) because
such efforts do not fit in the fight against the (false) paradigm.
V. UNITING INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION RESPONSES
There is a growing understanding that the simple
solutions offered by legislative policies broadly applied to
every offender have not been effective in keeping children
safe or preventing sexual abuse.
Furthermore, the
isolation and stigmatizing effect of legislation on sex
offenders and their families have generated a number of
unintended consequences that limit family, community,
and societal ability to prevent sexual abuse in the first
place. Tough restrictive policies . . . are applied broadly
and typically do not recognize the continuum of behaviors
of sexual abuse, the range of ages of those who sexually
abuse, and the range of risk posed by sex offenders to re82. Taleb uses the phrase “narrative fallacy” in a similar manner as post hoc
rationalizations. See TALEB, supra note 78, at 62–84. The narrative fallacy is our
(i.e., humans’) inability to look at a series of events without giving the events an
explanation (i.e., narration). Id. at 63–64. By linking events together through
perceived causes (real or imaginary), those events “make more sense” to us but
also give us a false sense of understanding (which exacerbates the black swan
event). Id. at 64.
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83

offend.
MNCASA has advanced several legislative proposals in recent
years with varying degrees of success. MNCASA’s annual policy
agenda, developed with the assistance of a multidisciplinary
committee, typically has three sections, addressing sexual violence
prevention, support and care for victims, and access to justice. The
policy agenda recognizes that a well-rounded legislative response
takes into account primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention
approaches.
MNCASA’s legislative agenda is generally met with bipartisan
support, so any barriers to passage tend to come from fiscal impact
(costs to the system such as prison beds) rather than philosophical
or political difference. For example, over the past four years,
MNCASA has worked with supportive legislators on both sides of
the aisle to propose two noncontroversial bills: presumptive
executed sentencing for repeat sex offenders and enhancement
from a gross misdemeanor to a felony for repeat fifth-degree
84
criminal-sexual-conduct convictions.
The former addresses an
omission when the sentencing guidelines were changed in 2006,
and the latter recognizes that some sex offenders engaged in
nonconsensual sexual contact could conceivably be convicted of
the same crime over and over yet never reach a higher level of
85
accountability.
These bills are primarily concerned with system intervention
for a sex offender, but there are prevention aspects as well: namely,
identifying someone who has a propensity to re-offend. While it
cannot be proven that an offender who repeatedly commits a lowlevel criminal sexual conduct crime in the fifth degree will
“graduate” to more serious sex crimes, heightened scrutiny will
lead ideally to more system involvement with the offender and
perhaps better opportunities to prevent future crimes.
The costs associated with these two bill proposals are relatively
low (each comes in under $100,000 in the first year with
comparative amounts in the subsequent years), and yet they cannot
seem to move at all through the legislature because of the

83. TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 42.
84. During the 2011–12 biennium, HF660/SF415 and HF532/SF794,
respectively. See H.F. 660, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.F. 794, 87th. Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.F. 532, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.F. 415,
87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011).
85. See Minn. H.F. 660; Minn. S.F. 794; Minn. H.F. 532; Minn. S.F. 415.
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associated costs related to more prison resources. Meanwhile, costs
incurred by the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, for example,
continue to rise at an alarming annual rate, and the legislature
continues to support these costs, although with the recognition
86
that they are not sustainable.
While fiscal caution is
understandable given the significant state budget cuts in recent
years, a small investment in early intervention and possible
prevention seems like a reasonable price to pay. In the absence of
a cost-benefit analysis to support a sure connection between policy
change, fiscal investment, and a successful system response, it still
seems prudent to make small yet targeted changes in the criminal
sexual conduct laws that ensure ongoing system involvement with
repeat offenders and create the potential to prevent future
87
crimes.
A successful bill from the 2012 legislative session requires the
Minnesota Department of Health to report on sexual violence
88
incidence and prevalence data.
Data collected from various
sources will help to inform policy proposals on sexual violence in
the future, promoting a more evidence-based approach. Data can
be useful in evaluating both prevention- and intervention-oriented
legislative responses to sexual violence.
One area of controversy in the public policy arena is around
the issue of comprehensive sexual health education. This concept
does not enjoy bipartisan support; there are political and
philosophical differences about who should teach youth about
sexuality and sexual health, and what information should be shared
with youth. In the past, MNCASA has supported bills (none of
which passed) with its community partners in the Coalition for
86. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 51, at 1.
87. A cost-benefit analysis of legislative policy regarding criminal sexual
conduct laws would be a welcome addition to this discussion. A recent analysis of
government-funded intervention in the lives of homeless and sexually exploited
girls, for example, showed a return of thirty-four dollars for every one dollar spent.
LAUREN MARTIN & RICHARD LOTSPEICH, EARLY INTERVENTION TO AVOID SEX TRADING
AND TRAFFICKING OF MINNESOTA’S FEMALE YOUTH: A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 60
(2012), available at http://www.miwrc.org/system/uploaded_files/0000/0147
/Benefit-Cost-Study_Full_Report_9-4-2012.pdf. For other discussions of costbenefit analyses in the context of sex offender policy, see Janus, supra note 1;
Robert A. Prentky & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Rehabilitation of Child Molesters: A CostBenefit Analysis, in CHILD TRAUMA I: ISSUES AND RESEARCH 417 (Ann Wolbert Burgess
ed., 1992).
88. Sue Hegarty, A Positive Balance, SESSION WKLY., May 25, 2012, at 33,
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/sessionweekly/art.asp?ls_year=87
&issueid_=78&storyid=3200&year_=2012.
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89

Responsible Sex Ed because a better understanding of sexuality,
particularly among young people, provides a gateway opportunity
for discussions about the prevention of sexual violence, coercive
90
behaviors, what consent really means, and other related issues.
Comprehensive sexual health education also plays an important
role in related public policy discussions, such as how to respond to
“sexting,” bullying, and sexual harassment, particularly amongst
91
So, even as lawmakers consider intervention-style
youth.
approaches to dealing with these sorts of problems, there should
always be a prevention message attached.
Finally, MNCASA’s legislative agenda is driven by guiding
principles. With regard to the system response to sex offenders,
MNCASA continues to see civil commitment as one option within a
preferably wide-ranging system response, particularly for the most
dangerous perpetrators. It also recognizes the need for less
restrictive alternatives to secure facility commitments for some
other offenders who present less of a risk to the public (including
re-entry programs providing better opportunities for housing and
employment) and always maintains that continued meaningful
92
financial support for victim services is essential.
Various options should be considered, such as indeterminate
sentencing, specialized courts, and sex offender review boards
charged with determining the terms of release. The Department of
Human Services Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task
Force will look at these and many other potential
93
recommendations during the 2013 legislative session and beyond.
89. See COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE SEX ED, http://www.coalitionforsexed
.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
90. See ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, COMPREHENSIVE SEX EDUCATION: RESEARCH AND
RESULTS 1–3 (2009), available at http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage
/advfy/documents/fscse.pdf; CAROLINE PALMER, WHY SEXTING IS VEXING 5
(2010), available at http://www.mncasa.org/Documents/policy_organizing_17
_3683469455.pdf.
91. See PALMER, supra note 90, at 5; see also Connection Between Bullying and
Sexual Violence Perpetration, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 11,
2012), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/bullying_sv.html.
92. See TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 2–4.
93. For a review of the Task Force’s meeting minutes and resource materials,
see Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force, MINN. DEPARTMENT. HUMAN
SERVICES, http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC
_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased&dDocName=dhs16
_171337 (last updated Mar. 29, 2013 3:05 PM). The Task Force composition is
multidisciplinary with members including representatives from judicial, legislative
(bipartisan), law enforcement, prosecutorial, defense, victim service, treatment,
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Many of these issues were explored in great detail by the
Governor’s Commission on Sex Offender Policy, and it is certain
that the Task Force will also be looking to such areas as less
restrictive alternatives to secure facility commitments, sentencing
practices, changes to the criminal sexual conduct laws, funding,
94
and prevention.
In addition, MNCASA would like to see greater attention paid
to increased access to sex offender treatment policies for
adolescents and children with sexual behavior problems, crossagency coordination of existing state intervention and prevention
services to maximize the policy impact on primary prevention, and
state funding for primary prevention services. Concurrently,
support for sexual assault victim advocacy services must be
maintained with reasonable funding and more access to services in
every county and reservation in Minnesota. During the state
government shutdown of 2011, the district court and special master
recognized that sexual assault advocacy and crisis response
programs are “critical core function[s] of government” and are
95
“crucial to the safety of Minnesota communities.”
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of sexual violence is endemic—its occurrence is
steady, as opposed to spiking, like during an epidemic. Its
relatively unchanging nature also suggests a certain level of
acceptance by society that some portion of the population will be
subjected to this type of harm. This is not to say that society or
and county administration perspectives. It will complete its work in December
2013.
94. See generally GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION, supra note 26. Among the report’s
many recommendations are the development of a blended determinateindeterminate sentencing system for sex offenders, creation of a Sex Offender
Release Board, increasing the statutory maximum indeterminate sentencing to life
for offenders with prior histories of criminal sexual conduct, increased penalties
for specific statutory sections, specialized sex offender caseload supervision,
special considerations for juvenile offenders, establishment of a Sex Offender
Policy Board, evaluation of sex offender registry information, creation of a
specialized panel for civil commitments, creating structured treatment options,
review of collateral consequences attendant to a sex offense conviction, and many
more. Id. at 1–6.
95. Special Master Recommendations Regarding Petition of Minnesota
Coalition Against Sexual Assault at 3–4, In re Temporary Funding of Core
Functions of the Exec. Branch of the State of Minn., No. 62-CV-11-5203 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2011), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/2
/Public/Civil/Order_regarding_mn_casa.pdf.
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policymakers are complacent about the problem, just that the
response is misplaced at times, and, as a result, we have not
witnessed a dramatic positive change. This lack of success can feel
defeating and demoralizing. We are only seeing the black swans—
the aberrations that distract us—and failing to look more broadly
to the expertise and experience that will help policymakers work
96
toward the solutions that can create a difference.
According to Tabachnick and Klein, “When communities hold
offenders accountable in thoughtful ways that prevent re-offense,
they increase the likelihood that others will get the help they need
97
before they perpetrate sexual abuse.” With each passing year, we
learn more about the nature of sexual violence, about the people
who commit the crimes, about the societal norms that promote
unhealthy sexual images, and about the most effective policies
using evidence-based measures. The thoughtful response that
Tabachnick and Klein put forth is one that balances prevention
and intervention strategies in a comprehensive approach, one that
is more proactive than reactive, and one that recognizes the
specific needs of all involved (victims, offenders, and society as a
whole). In other words, the thoughtful response is perhaps the
most difficult one of all, but as the problem of sexual violence
persists and as public policy continues to miss the mark, it is the
response that must be made.

96.
97.

See supra Part IV.
TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 5, at 5.
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